Maximalist by Stephen Sestanovich

Author:Stephen Sestanovich [Sestanovich, Stephen]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-385-34966-6
Publisher: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group
Published: 2014-02-10T16:00:00+00:00

IN THE LATE 1950s, when Dwight Eisenhower sought to calm fears of a “missile gap,” his efforts had been undercut by a string of crises—in Berlin, in the Middle East, in the Taiwan Strait, in Latin America. In the 1970s, a similar resurgence of Soviet-American competition in the Third World undermined Kissinger’s claim to be running a successful foreign policy. North Vietnam, which had steadily strengthened its forces in the South after the Paris agreement was signed in 1973, opened its long-anticipated offensive in January 1975. The chief of the Soviet general staff had visited Hanoi a month before to aid in the preparations, and Moscow’s military aid surged. As South Vietnamese provincial capitals fell, and refugees fled from the oncoming Communist forces, Washington faced a painful question: would it—could it—do anything to prevent a Communist victory? The administration’s answer produced another confrontation with Congress, for Kissinger the worst yet. It marked the start, in his words, of a “nihilistic nightmare.”34

At first the secretary of state said he relished a scrap. He told his staff that his public stance on Vietnam would be aggressive. “We are going to say what we think the national interest is. And if we take a little heat from the Congress, we will take it.” When the Pentagon drew up a list of legally permitted measures—from more reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam to sending an aircraft carrier briefly through the Gulf of Tonkin—Kissinger was for all of them. He urged Ford to press Congress to restore recently cut military aid for South Vietnam, then to seek a supplemental appropriation of more than $700 million. Only a strong stand would work, he argued. “It has been my experience that when we move timidly”—here he channeled Nixon again—“we lose. When we are bold, we are successful.”35

Yet virtually no one answered Kissinger’s call. The media uproar over possible military moves—even the largely meaningless ones being contemplated—was so strong that he quickly backtracked. Weeks passed with no congressional agreement to offer South Vietnam anything. Those who had once supported the war effort now felt a weary fatalism. Scoop Jackson himself—long Kissinger’s most vocal critic for not standing up to the Soviet Union—rejected more aid. “There has to be a limit,” he said. “There has to be a ceiling. There has to be an end.”36

By April, although Ford kept asking for military assistance—and made his case before a joint session of Congress—the only real questions were how quickly the United States would evacuate its own people, and how many South Vietnamese it would take with it. New York senator Jacob Javits told Ford, “I will give you large sums for evacuation, but not one nickel for military aid.” Senator Joe Biden of Delaware was less compassionate: “I will vote for any amount for getting the Americans out. I don’t want it mixed with getting the Vietnamese out.” Many in Congress shared this view. When the administration first asked for $500 million for refugee resettlement, the request was immediately rejected.37

As the collapse continued, Kissinger kept insisting, often vehemently, that the United States had to act.

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